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This paper presents an embedded security sublanguage for enforcing information-flow
policies in the standard Haskell programming language. The sublanguage provides useful
information-flow control mechanisms including dynamic security lattices, run-time code
privileges and declassification all without modifying the base language. This design avoids
the redundant work of producing new languages, lowers the threshold for adopting
security-typed languages, and also provides great flexibility and modularity for using
security-policy frameworks.
The embedded security sublanguage is designed using a standard combinator interface
called arrows. Computations constructed in the sublanguage have static and explicit
control-flow components, making it possible to implement information-flow control using
static-analysis techniques at run time, while providing strong security guarantees. This
paper presents a formal proof that our embedded sublanguage provides noninterference, a
concrete Haskell implementation and an example application demonstrating the proposed
techniques.1
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Language-based information-flow security [13] has a long, rich history with many (mostly theoretical) results. This prior
work has focused mainly on the problems of static program analysis for a wide variety of computation models and policy
features. Often these analyses are presented as type systems whose soundness is justified by some form of noninterference
result. The approach is compelling because programming-language techniques can be used to specify and enforce security
policies that cannot be achieved by conventionalmechanisms such as access control and encryption. Two full-scale language
implementations have been developed: Jif [6,8] is a variant of Java, and Flow Caml [15,12] is an extension of Caml.
However, despite this rather large (and growing!) body of work on language-based information-flow security, there has
been relatively little adoption of the proposed techniques—two success stories are the ‘‘taint-checking mode’’ available in
the Perl language and the use of information-flow analysis to separate lower integrity components from higher integrity
components built in the SparkAda [2] language.
One important reasonwhy these domain-specific security-typed languages have not beenwidely applied is that, because
the information-flow policies are intended to apply in an end-to-end fashion, the whole system has to be written in the new
language. However, it is expensive to build large software systems in a new language. Doing so can be justified only if the
benefit of using the new language outweighs the cost of migrating to the new language—including the costs of retraining
programmers and the time and expense necessary to port existing libraries and other code bases.
Moreover, in practice, it may well be the case that only a small part of the system (maybe only a few variables in a
large program) has information-flow security requirements. Although the system may be large and complex, the secret
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information flow in the system may not be completely unmanageable. In such cases, it is probably more convenient to use
the programming language that best fits the primary functionality of the system rather than its security requirements, and
manage security issues by traditionalmeans such as code auditing and careful software engineering practices. Such practical
solutions are often a compromise, because there is no provable security indeed. In reality, there is a language adoption
threshold based on the ratio of security requirements to functionality requirements, and this threshold is very high.
1.1. Background on security-typed languages
In security-typed languages like Jif [6,8] and Flow Caml [15,12], variables can have security annotations in their type
declarations. Each variable has a security level, represented syntactically by a label in the program. The security levels are
usually partially ordered and form a lattice. For example, the simplest security lattice {L,H}, L v H defines two labels L and
H and specifies an ordering between the two security levels represented by these labels. At compile time, security-typed
programs are checked to guarantee that there is no information flow from higher security levels to lower security levels;
violations of this information-flow policy result in type errors.
Security-typed languages often favor static type checking, because information-flow analysis requires the view of the
entire control-flow graph in order to examine implicit information flows caused by conditional branches. For example, the
C program ‘‘if (h==0) l=0; else l=1;’’ has an implicit flow from h to l and, although there is no explicit assignment
‘‘l=(h==0);’’, these code fragments are effectively equivalent. In a dynamically typed language, such implicit flows are
difficult to capture. For example, the taint-checking mode of Perl does not capture the implicit flow in the above code: even
if h is tainted and there is information flow from h to l, l is still not tainted. This is fine because the taint-checking mode
is used only to provide a modest level of integrity guarantees. However, for confidentiality purposes, implicit flows are often
unacceptable, especially when the program is not trusted.
To make security-typed languages practical, a feature called declassification is necessary: sometimes, we do need
information flow from higher levels to lower levels, but only in permitted ways. For example, secret information can be
sent to public places after it is encrypted. One popular solution is to make declassification an explicit (and unsafe) type cast;
it is thus the programmers’ responsibility to use declassification safely. When the code is not trusted, declassification can be
dangerous. The decentralized label model [7] solves this problem by assigning code privileges to program modules, so each
module can only declassify information of certain security levels that are determined by the code privilege.
1.2. Embedded security-typed sublanguages
This paper presents a different approach to enforcing information-flow security policies. Rather than producing a new
language from scratch, we show how to encode traditional information-flow type systems using general features of an
existing, modern programming language. In particular, we show how the abstract data type and the type class features found
in Haskell [11] can be used to build a module that effectively provides a security-typed sublanguage embedded in Haskell
itself. This sublanguage can interoperate smoothly with existing Haskell code while still providing strong information-flow
security guarantees. Importantly, we do not need to modify the design or implementation of Haskell itself—we use features
in its standard (but advanced) type system.
Our approach reduces the adoption threshold for systems implemented in Haskell: such systems can be made more
secure without completely rewriting them in a new language. The implementation can be a fine-grained mixture of normal
code and security-hardened code (variables, data and computations over secure data). The programmer needs to protect
only sensitive data and computation using a software library, which enforces the information-flow policies throughout the
entire system and provides end-to-end security goals like noninterference.
Another benefit of our approach is flexibility. A specialized language like Jif must pick a fixed policy framework in which
the security policies are expressed. Considering the plethora of features present in the literature expressing the label lattice,
declassification options [14], dynamic policy information [16,19], etc., it is unlikely that any particular choice of policy
languagewill be suitable for all programswith security concerns. By contrast, since it ismuch easier to build a librarymodule
than to build a new language, it is conceivable that different programs would choose to implement entirely different policy
frameworks. Our embedded sublanguage approach is modular in the sense that it provides an interface through which the
programmer can choose which policy framework and type system to use for specific security goals. In this paper we sketch
one possible policy framework that illustrates one particular choice of label lattice, declassificationmechanism, and support
for dynamic policies, but others could readily be implemented instead.
Although we use Haskell’s advanced type system and helpful features like the ability to overload syntax, studying how
to encode information-flow policies in the context of Haskell can point to how similar efforts might be undertaken in more
mainstream languages like Java. Also, since the features we use are intended to be ‘‘general purpose’’, they are more likely
to find a home in a mainstream language than the less widely applicable security types. Evidence of this can be found, for
example, in Sun’s recent addition of parametric polymorphism, a key component of our approach, to Java.
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1.3. Overview of technical development
There are two key technical challenges in embedding a useful security-typed sublanguage in Haskell. The first problem
is that enforcing information-flow policies requires static analysis of the control-flow graph of the embedded programs—
purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms are generally too conservative in practice. The second problem is representing
the policy information itself—depending on the desired model, the policy information might be quite complex, perhaps
depending on information available only at run time.
Our solution to the first problem is to use arrows [3]. Intuitively, arrows provide an abstract interface for defining
embedded sublanguages that support standard programming constructs familiar to programmers: sequential composition,
conditional branches, and loops. Haskell provides convenient syntactic sugar for writing programs whose semantics are
given by an arrow implementation.
To address the second problem, we use Haskell’s type classmechanism to give an interface for security lattices. Programs
written in the embedded language can be parameterized with respect to this interface. Moreover, the embedded language
can easily be given security-specific features such as a declassification operation or run-time representation of privileges
for access-control checks.
In both cases, we make use of Haskell’s strong type system to guarantee that the abstractions enforcing the security
policies are not violated. This encapsulation means that it is not possible to use the full power of the Haskell language to
circumvent the information-flow checks performed by the embedded language, for example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief tutorial of the arrow interface. Section 3 presents
the detailed implementation of an arrow-based sublanguage for information-flow control. Section 4 gives some example
programs that illustrate how the secure embedded language and the Haskell program can be smoothly integrated and
considers the issues with enforcing the desired security properties. Section 5 formalizes and proves the security guarantee
of our security sublanguage. Section 6 discusses some limitations and caveats with this approach and describes some future
work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The arrows interface
The concept of arrowswasproposedbyHughes [3] as a generalization ofmonads [18]. Bothmonads and arrows are generic
interfaces for constructing programs using combinators. This section presents an informal and brief tutorial of arrows2 and
shows how arrows can be used to construct computations with explicit control-flow structures.
2.1. Definition of arrows
The following code specifies the simplest Arrow type class. Here, a is an abstract type of arrow with input type b and
output type c. This arrow type class supports only three operations: pure, (>>>), and first. 
class Arrow a where
pure :: (b -> c) -> a b c
(>>>) :: a b c -> a c d -> a b d
first :: a b c -> a (b, d) (c, d) 
Basic blocks and compositions
The pure operation lifts a Haskell function of type b->c into the arrow; such lifted functions serve as the ‘‘basic blocks’’
of the control-flow graphs constructed via arrow combinators. The infix operation (>>>) provides sequential (horizontal)
composition of computations, and first provides parallel (vertical) composition of computations.
An instance of the Arrow type class is required to satisfy a set of axioms that specify coherence properties between the
operations. For example, (>>>) is required to be associative.We omit the complete description of the arrow axioms here; for
our purposes, there is only one interesting case to consider, and it is discussed in Section 6. The simplest instance of Arrow
is Haskell’s function arrow constructor (->) itself: every function of type b -> c is also an arrow computation (->) b c.
Using the concept of monad transformers [5], one can also build arrow transformers, which correspond closely to the
categorical notion of functors. Monad and arrow transformers allow program functionality be composed in a modular,
layered fashion.
Representing conditionals and loops
The basic Arrow interface does not provide the ability to construct conditional computations—it can construct only
control-flow graphs that represent straight line code with no branches. Two other type classes refine arrows by permitting
conditional branches and loops.
2 The related references [3,10,9] in the bibliography can be used for more detailed studies of arrows.
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The ArrowChoice type class provides an operation called left that extends the Arrow interface with the ability to
perform a one-sided branch computation depending on the arrow’s input value. In Haskell, the type Either b d describes
a value that is a tagged union (or option) type that carries either a value of type b or one of type d. 
class Arrow a => ArrowChoice a where
left :: a b c -> a (Either b d) (Either c d) 
Using left and the other arrow primitives, the following operations can be implemented to construct different kinds of
conditional computations: 
right :: a b c -> a (Either d b) (Either d c)
(+++) :: a b c -> a b’ c’->a (Either b b’) (Either c c’)
(|||) :: a b d -> a c d -> a (Either b c) d 
ArrowLoop provides the embedded language with a loop construct sufficient for encoding while and for loops. Intuitively,
the loop operator feeds the d output of the arrow back into the d input of the arrow, introducing a cycle in the control-flow
graph: 
class Arrow a => ArrowLoop a where
loop :: a (b, d) (c, d) -> a b c 
The benefit of having this operation is that recursive computations can be constructed as a finite combination of arrow
components. We will use this property in Section 3.6.
Translating the do-syntax
Programming directly with the arrow operations is sometimes cumbersome, because arrows require a point-free
programming style. The do-syntax for arrows [9] provides syntactic sugar for arrowprogramming, such as arrowabstraction,
arrow application, sequential composition, conditional branching and recursion. Internally, the Haskell compiler3 translates
the do-syntax used in the embedded sublanguage into the basic arrow operations. For example, conditional statements are
translated to pure, >>> and ||| operators, using the following rule:
[[ proc p -> if e then c1 else c2 ]] =
pure (\p -> if e then Left p else Right p)
>>> [[ proc p -> c1 ]] ||| [[ proc p -> c2 ]]
This rule translates the if command in the sublanguage. The if construct in the translated code is the conditional expression
in the base Haskell language. The sublanguage syntax ‘‘proc p->’’ provides an arrow abstraction that binds the arrow input
to the variable p.
The compiler is able to resolve this syntax overloading by using type information. For example, the type Protected
mentioned in our implementation described below informs the compiler to use our definition for |||, which is given by
our FlowArrow instance of the ArrowChoice type class. This feature allows programmer-defined embedded sublanguages
to have convenient syntax.
2.2. Control flow in arrow sublanguages
The Haskell programming language itself provides branching, looping, and other control-flow constructs, so one might
wonder why it is necessary to re-implement all of these features in the embedded sublanguage. Compared to Haskell’s full
control-flowmechanisms (which also include function calls and exceptions, for example), the arrow type classes are actually
quite impoverished. The arrow interfaces isolate the base language (Haskell) and the sublanguage (arrows): by design, the
control-flow constructs in the base language cannot be directly used to represent the control flow of the sublanguage.
This separation property is crucial for the security analysis of arrow-based sublanguages. If an arrow implements only
the operations in the ArrowChoice type class, conditional branches on arrow computations can only be implemented using
the given arrow operations left, right, (+++), and (|||). By keeping the arrow implementation abstract, the programmer
is forced to use these arrow operations for writing conditional branches, because there is no other way to manipulate the
interface.
Therefore, by designing the arrow interface with limited control-flow primitives, the control-flow graph of an arrow
computation is determined by the composition of primitive arrowoperations. In otherwords, arrows can force computations
to be constructed with static and explicit control-flow structures. This makes it possible to completely analyze the
information flow in an arrow-based sublanguage before running the computation. A more permissive interface to the
sublanguage (such as provided by monads for example) would allow base language branches to leak information about
supposedly protected data.
3 We use the Glasgow Haskell Compiler (http://www.haskell.org/GHC).
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3. An embedded security-typed language
This section presents the design of our secure embedded sublanguage using the arrows interface. Our design uses the
structure of arrow transformers, which allows arrow sublanguages to be composed in a modular, layered fashion.
3.1. Encoding the security lattice
In our embedded language, the security labels are encoded using term-level values.We start by defining a generic Haskell
interface for security labels and lattices: the type class Lattice provides a set of operations common for all security lattices. 
class (Eq a) => Lattice a where
label_top :: a
label_bottom :: a
label_join :: a -> a -> a
label_meet :: a -> a -> a
label_leq :: a -> a -> Bool 
The programmer has the freedom to choose the implementation of the actual security lattice. Because we are encoding
labels using terms, there is no limitation on the expressiveness of security policies: any security lattice can be encoded as
long as its labels and the operations on them can be represented using Haskell. For simplicity and ease of presentation, we
use the following three-point lattice throughout the rest of the paper. 
data TriLabel = LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Lattice TriLabel where
label_top = HIGH
label_bottom = LOW
label_join x y=if x ‘label_leq‘ y then y else x
label_meet x y=if x ‘label_leq‘ y then x else y
label_leq LOW _ = True
label_leq MEDIUM LOW = False
label_leq MEDIUM _ = True
label_leq HIGH HIGH = True
label_leq HIGH _ = False 
3.2. Encoding flow types and constraints
This paper employs a simple information-flow type system for purely functional arrow computations. An arrow
computation has an input security label l1 and an output security label l2. Each typing judgment has the form
Φ ` c : l1 → l2
where c is a purely functional computation, l1 → l2 is the flow type assigned to c , and Φ is a list of label constraints. The
type system is presented in Fig. 1. There is also a certification judgment in the type system. We defer its discussion until
Section 3.5.
The sublanguage types appearing in the typing judgments are encoded using the Haskell data type: 
data Flow l = Trans l l | Flat 
(1) Trans l1 l2 specifies a security type l1 → l2.
(2) Flatmeans the input and output can be given the same arbitrary label. It specifies a security type l→ l, where the label
l can be determined by constraints in the context.
The label constraints are encoded using the Constraint data type: 
data Constraint l = LEQ l l | USERGEQ l 
(1) LEQ l1 l2 represents a direct ordering between two labels: l1 v l2.
(2) USERGEQ l represents the constraint l v user. It requires that the run-time code privilege, which is represented as a
label, be at least l. This will be used in Section 3.5 when we implement declassification.
The purpose of the constraint set Φ is to implement late binding of the security lattice. The type system collects the label
constraints when secure computations are constructed from individual components. Such constraints are checkedwhen the
secure computation is accessed through the policy enforcementmechanism, namely, the cert operation. This designmakes
it possible to use dynamic security lattices and also helps when implementing declassification.
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Φ ` c : l1 → l2
∅ ` pure f : l→ l pure
Φ1 ` c1 : l1 → l2
Φ2 ` c2 : l3 → l4
Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {l2 v l3} ` c1 >>> c2 : l1 → l4 seq
Φ ` c : l1 → l2
Φ ` op c : l1 → l2 one
Φ1 ` c1 : l1 → l2
Φ2 ` c2 : l3 → l4
Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ` c1 op c2 : l1 u l3 → l2 unionsq l4 par
Φ ` c : l1 → l2
Φ ∪ {l2 v l1} ` loop c : l1 → l2 loop
∅ ` tag l : l→ l tag
{l1 v user} ` declassify l1 l2 : l1 → l2 decl
L, luser  c : lin → lout
Φ ` c : l1 → l2 lin v l1
l2 v lout L ` Φ[luser/user]
L, luser  c : lin → lout cert
Fig. 1. Information-flow type system implemented by the sublanguage.
3.3. Encoding typing judgments and rules
The abstract data type FlowArrow defines our secure embedded language by implementing the arrow interfaces
described above: 
data FlowArrow l a b c = FA
{ computation :: a b c
, flow :: Flow l
, constraints :: [Constraint l] } 
A value of type FlowArrow l a b c is a record with three fields. The computation field encapsulates an arrow of type a b
c that is the underlying computation to be protected. The flow field specifies the security levels for the input and output of
the computation. The constraints field stores the list of flow constraints Φ when the arrow computation is constructed
from smaller components.
FlowArrow encodes an information-flow typing judgment for a purely functional arrow computation, using the encoding
of flow types and constraints we just defined. The typing judgmentΦ ` c : l1 → l2 is represented by the value:
FA c (Trans l1 l2)Φ
FlowArrow is implemented using a generic design of arrow transformers and it is parameterized by several types:
(1) The type l of security labels. (FlowArrow l) is an arrow transformer.
(2) The purely functional arrow awe are transforming from. The simplest and most common case of a is the function arrow
(->). The result (FlowArrow l a) is also an arrow.
(3) The input type b and output type c.
The arrow amust be purely functional and must have no side-effects. Although FlowArrow is a generic arrow transformer,
we do require that the arrow a represent a purely functional computation where information flows from one end to the
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instance (Lattice l,Arrow a)=>Arrow (FlowArrow l a) where
pure f = FA { computation = pure f −−PURE –
, flow = Flat
, constraints = [] }
(FA c1 f1 t1) >>> (FA c2 f2 t2) = −−SEQ –
let (f,c) = flow_seq f1 f2 in
FA { computation = c1 >>> c2
, flow = f
, constraints = t1 ++ t2 ++ c }
first (FA c f t) = −−ONE –
FA { computation = first c
, flow = f
, constraints = t }
(FA c1 f1 t1) &&& (FA c2 f2 t2) = −−PAR –
FA { computation = c1 &&& c2
, flow = flow_par f1 f2
, constraints = t1++t2 }
(FA c1 f1 t1) *** (FA c2 f2 t2) = −−PAR –
FA { computation = c1 *** c2
, flow = flow_par f1 f2
, constraints = t1++t2 }
instance (Lattice l, ArrowChoice a) =>
ArrowChoice (FlowArrow l a) where
left (FA c f t) = −−ONE –
FA { computation = left c
, flow = f
, constraints = t }
(FA c1 f1 t1) +++ (FA c2 f2 t2) = −−PAR –
FA { computation = c1 +++ c2
, flow = flow_par f1 f2
, constraints = t1++t2 }
(FA c1 f1 t1) ||| (FA c2 f2 t2) = −−PAR –
FA { computation = c1 ||| c2
, flow = flow_par f1 f2
, constraints = t1++t2 }
instance (Lattice l, ArrowLoop a) =>
ArrowLoop (FlowArrow l a) where
loop (FA c f t) = −−LOOP –
let t’ = constraint_loop f in
FA { computation = loop c
, flow = f
, constraints = t ++ t’ }
where
constraint_loop Flat = []
constraint_loop (Trans l1 l2) = [LEQ l2 l1] 
Fig. 2. Implementation of arrow operations. 
flow_seq::Flow l->Flow l->(Flow l, [Constraint l])
flow_seq (Trans l1 l2) (Trans l3 l4)=
(Trans l1 l4, [LEQ l2 l3])
flow_seq Flat f2 = (f2,[])
flow_seq f1 Flat = (f1,[])
flow_par :: (Lattice l)=>Flow l->Flow l->Flow l
flow_par (Trans l1 l2) (Trans l3 l4) =
Trans (label_meet l1 l3) (label_join l2 l4)
flow_par Flat f2 = f2
flow_par f1 Flat = f1 
Fig. 3. Implementation of arrow operations (continued).
other, so the information-flow types in the form of l1 → l2 makes sense. In the rest of the paper, the reader can assume a is
the function arrow (->) for ease of understanding.
(FlowArrow l a) is an arrow, so we can use FlowArrow as a sublanguage to represent computation. At the same time,
(FlowArrow l a) also encodes a typing judgment, so we can verify the information-flow policies for the computation.
Essentially, the implementation of (FlowArrow l a) is a type checker: each arrow operation implements a typing rule
for that operation. For standard arrow operations on a, FlowArrow lifts them by (1) running the original operation on
the computation fields of arguments, and (2) computing the flow types and constraints using such information from the
arguments.
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The implementation of FlowArrow is given in Figs. 2 and 3. In the definition of each arrow operation, the operation in
FlowArrow (on the left-hand side) is implemented using operations in the arrow a (on the right-hand side).
The pure operation returns a Flat flow type and no constraints, because such computations have no information-flow
policies on them. It implements the pure typing rule. Flat represents a flow type l→ l, but the label l never appears in the
implementation—it can always be inferred from context.
The (>>>) operation sequentially composes two arrow computations. The flow types and constraints are computed using
the flow seq function, which implements the seq typing rule.
The first and left operations implement the one typing rule. The (&&&), (***), (|||) and (+++) operations are
parallel compositions and they implement the par rule. The flow_par function is used to compute parallel composition
of flow types.
The loop operation is slightly more interesting. It implements the loop typing rule. Since loop connects the output of a
computation back to its input, we generate a constraint to capture this information flow. This requires that the input and
the output have the same security level, unless there is declassification inside the computation.
As described in Section 2, the do-syntax of the secure sublanguage is translated to these standard arrow operations.
Therefore, the typing judgment for codewritten in the do-syntax can be derived by combining the typing rules implemented
in these standard arrow operations. For the translation of conditional commands shown in the end of Section 2, the
combination of typing rules yields essentially the same constraints as the following cond rule found in conventional
information-flow type systems:
Γ ` e1 : l1 Γ ` e2 : l2
Γ ` e3 : l3 l1 v l2 unionsq l3
Γ ` if e1 then e2 else e3 : l2 unionsq l3 cond
3.4. Policy specification
So far, the typing rules implemented in FlowArrow permit the construction of computations from smaller components
while composing their information-flow policies. Pure computations are given the l → l flow type, but we need a way to
introduce more interesting flow types. The tag operation annotates a computation with a security label. It implements the
tag rule in Fig. 1. 
tag::(Lattice l,Arrow a)=> l -> FlowArrow l a b b
tag l = FA { computation = pure (\x->x)
, flow = Trans l l
, constraints = [] } 
When tag is applied to a label l, it creates an arrow that represents an empty step of computation, with the flow type
l→ l. Intuitively, tag inserts a ‘‘pipe’’ in the middle of the computation, with explicit flow types specified on both ends. For
example, to annotate the confidential value secret with label HIGH, we can use the following code which has a flow type
HIGH→ HIGH:
pure (\_->secret) >>> tag HIGH
To assert that the output of a computation chas no confidential information,we can simply use the following code to connect
c to a ‘‘low’’ pipe:
c >>> tag LOW
For confidentiality policies, we care about the future of secret computation, i.e. where information will flow to. Therefore,
a good pattern for protecting confidentiality is to append tag to the output of the computation we want to protect. The
design of tag and the arrow types are completely symmetrical. If we have labels for integrity policies, we can connect the
output of tag to computations that require trustworthy data as inputs. This is a bi-directional design that works for both
confidentiality and integrity policies.
3.5. Declassification
Declassification is a practical requirement for language-based information-flow control. We need a mechanism to allow
information flow from high levels to low levels, but only in controlled ways. The decentralized label model (DLM) [7] solves
this problem by assigning code with authority. Each declassification statement can only weaken the security policy that
belongs to the authority of code. In our arrows framework, there is no difficulty of encoding the labels in DLM, but we need
a declassification mechanism that takes code authority into account.
For simplicity of presentation, we designed the declassification construct and its corresponding flow constraints for
simple lattices such as the TriLabel lattice implemented earlier in this section. It is simpler than the declassification
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mechanism in Jif, but it implements the essence of code authority checking. This design can be generalized to any finite
lattice. 
declassify :: (Lattice l, Arrow a) =>
l -> l -> FlowArrow l a b b
declassify l1 l2 =
FA { computation = pure (\x->x)
, flow = Trans l1 l2
, constraints = [USERGEQ l1] } 
The declassify operation implements the decl rule in Fig. 1. It is similar to the tag operation except that it constructs a
‘‘pipe’’ where the security level of the output is lower than the level of input. Similar to other operations, declassify does
not check the policies directly, but it creates a constraint which can be checked later. When applied to two label values,
declassify l1 l2 creates an arrow with flow type l1 → l2 and a flow constraint USERGEQ l1 stating that the code privilege
must be at least l1. For example, if the code privilege is HIGH, it can declassify information from MEDIUM to LOW. But if the
code privilege is MEDIUM, it cannot declassify from HIGH to LOW.
3.6. Policy enforcement
Finally, we need to check the flow types and constraints that we have accumulated during the construction of a secure
computation. Since we have a declassification mechanism which takes code privilege into account, the code privilege must
be provided to check the constraints. 
data Privilege l = PR l
certify :: (Lattice l) => l -> l ->
Priv l -> FlowArrow l a b c -> a b c
certify l_in l_out (PR l_user) (FA c f t) =
if not $ check_levels l_in l_out f then
error $ "security level mismatch" ++ (show f)
else if not $ check_constraints l_user t then
error $ "constraints cannot be met"++(show t)
else c 
The judgment L, luser  c : lin → lout states the security property to be checked: given a security lattice L and the label luser
representing the code privilege, does the arrow computation c satisfy the information-flow policy lin → lout? The cert rule
in Fig. 1 checks this security property and the certify function implements this rule.
The certify operation takes a few arguments:
(1) The information-flow types lin and lout that we expect the computation to have. Suppose the flow type of the secure
computation is l1 → l2, certify calls another function to verify that lin v l1 and l2 v lout .
(2) The code privilege luser , under which the computation is performed. The certify operation checks all the constraints
that come with the secure computation. For any constraints of the form USERGEQ l, a check is performed to make sure
that l v luser . If any constraint is not satisfied, a run-time error is generated.
(3) A FlowArrow value that includes the secure computation to be checked. If all the above checks are successful, the
embedded secure computation is returned. Note that we stacked the arrow transformer FlowArrow on another arrow
a, this certify operation strips FlowArrow off and gives back computations in arrow a.
Although certify is a dynamic enforcement mechanism (it executes as part of the Haskell program), it provides strong
security guarantees. When an embedded computation is certified, its whole control structure is examined using an
information-flow analysis before any part of embedded computation is performed. This process is like type checking the
embedded sublanguage.
Branches over arrow computations can only be constructed using the operators provided in FlowArrow.4 The control
structure of a secure computation is independent of the values generated in the computation. Therefore, if the run-time
check fails, the failure does not leak information about secrets inside the computation.
A minor caveat is that recursive arrow computations should be constructed using the loop operation rather than using
standard Haskell recursion. The certify function checks the flow types and constraints of the whole computation, so it
forces evaluation of all arrow operations used to construct the computation. If the computation is recursively constructed
using standard Haskell recursion, certifywill essentially try to check an infinite control-flow graph with an infinite typing
derivation, which will exhaust Haskell’s stack space and eventually abort the program. In such cases secret information is
not leaked, but the secure computation should be rewritten using the loop operation.
4 Importantly, FlowArrow does not implement a richer interface such as the ArrowApply type class that would make it impossible to analyze the
control structure.
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The certify interface seems verbose, but it is very flexible to use. For protecting confidentiality, we only care about the
security level of the output, so the argument lin can always be label_bottom. We also require all secrets be declassified to
the lowest security level before reaching the output channel, so we let the argument lout always be label_bottom. Thus, we
hide the definition of certify and define a simpler operation cert:
cert = certify label_bottom label_bottom
3.7. Code privileges
When using certify, it is important that the code privilege is correctly specified: untrusted code cannot call certify
using a code privilege that it does not have. Our solution is to define an abstract data type Privilege that internally stores
a label as code privilege. The certify operation takes values of the abstract type Privilege as its input. 
data Privilege l = PR l 
The key point is to make the constructor PR only available in trusted modules. The program must be organized such that
untrusted code can only treat the Privilege type abstractly. Privileges can only be created in trusted code and passed to
untrusted code.
Developing appropriate design patterns for structuring privileged code is an important task that we leave to future work.
An interesting question, as with all capability-based authorization mechanisms, is how to revoke the privileges passed to
untrusted code. If the untrusted code has state and runs under several privileges in different places, it can steal privileges by
storing and reusing them. One solution is to encode version numbers in such privileges and have a global state to indicate
valid privileges, doing so would require the top-level code be inside a monad.
4. Example use of the embedded language
This section presents the features of our secure embedded sublanguage using code examples. All examples use the three-
point security lattice encoding in Section 3. First, we present some simple program fragments to show how information-
flow policies can be specified in programs. Then, we use a larger application to demonstrate declassification and policy
enforcement.
4.1. Programming with information-flow policies
The FlowArrow interface is designed to be generic, but it is fairly verbose to use. To make programs look more concise,
we define a type abbreviation for the common uses of FlowArrow. The type Protected a represents a secure computation
that takes no input and produces the output of type a.
type Protected a = FlowArrow TriLabel (->) () a
By default, protected computations constructed by pure have no information-flow constraints. Information-flow policies
can be specified by using the tag operation. The function tag_val takes an arbitrary computation x and a security label l
as inputs, converts x to a protected closure using pure, and composes it with an information-flow annotation using >>> and
tag. The output is a protected computation with an output label l. 
tag_val :: a -> TriLabel -> Protected a
tag_val x l = pure (\_ -> x) >>> tag l
cH = tag_val 3 HIGH
cM = tag_val 4 MEDIUM
cL = tag_val 5 LOW 
Using tag_val, we can define cH, cM, cL as protected valueswith different information-flow policies. The following shows
some computation using these protected values: 
t1 = liftA2 (+) cL cM
t2 = liftA2 (*) cH cM
t3 = proc () -> do
h <- cH -< ()
if h>3 then do x <- cM -< ()
returnA -< x
else do x <- t1 -< ()
returnA -< x 
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The liftA2 function is a generic arrow operation that can be used in our sublanguage to convert any standard binary
operator to an operator on protected types: t1 is the sum of cL and cM, t2 is the product of cH and cM. The definition of
t3 uses the do-syntax of arrows. Informally speaking, it represents the computation if cH>3 then cM else t1.
The security sublanguage rigorously captures both explicit and implicit information flows in protected computations.
When the above code is executed, t1 will have label MEDIUM, while t2 and t3 will have label HIGH. The control flow of the
protected computation is represented using operations provided by the sublanguage, and these operations keep track of the
information-flow policies and constraints incrementally during the construction of protected computations.
Any protected computation can be used together with the tag operation to restrict the information flow. The function
expects_medium takes a protected computation c as argument and requires the output of c to be no higher than MEDIUM: 
expects_medium :: Protected a -> Protected a
expects_medium c = c >>> tag MEDIUM 
Now, we can use this function with protected computations: 
success1 = expects_medium t1
failure2 = expects_medium t2
failure3 = expects_medium t3 
The first computation success1 is fine, because t1 has label MEDIUM. The second and the third both violate the information-
flow policies, because t2 and t3 both have label HIGHwhile MEDIUM is expected: information flows from HIGH to MEDIUM. If
we try to certify these three computations, the first will pass the certification (and hence be executable) but the latter two
fill fail certification (and hence not be executable).
4.2. An interactive multi-user application
This subsection uses an interactive application to demonstrate a more realistic use of the security sublanguage. It
simulates an online network service in which users can log in to access information. There are only two kinds of users:
guests and administrators. Guests have security level LOW while administrators have security level HIGH. we use the type
abbreviation Priv for code privileges:
type Priv = Privilege TriLabel
In this application, guests can enter numbers as price bids, while the administrator can log in to see the highest bid. The
information-flowpolicy is that guests are not allowed to knowwhat the highest bid is. To implement this policy,wemaintain
the highest bid as a global state statwith security level HIGH. The following code shows a simple session for guest services. 
guest_service::Priv->(Protected Int)->IO(Protected Int)
guest_service priv stat = do
{ putStrLn "Enter a number:";
i <- getNumber;
let stat’ = proc () -> do
{ x <- stat -< ();
if i>x then returnA -< i
else returnA -< x;
}
return stat’;
} 
The function guest_service takes two arguments: priv has type Priv and it represents a code privilege passed to this
function; stat has type Protected Int and it is the secret global state. The function returns a new state, which also has
type Protected Int. The main body of the guest service is written in Haskell’s standard IO monad; when it runs, it reads a
number from input and updates the state if the input i is larger than the protected state stat.
The body of the let expression is the computation written in our embedded sublanguage. It uses the do-syntax for
arrow operations, and the Haskell compiler translates code in the do-syntax to the standard arrow operations, which are
overloaded by our sublanguage using Haskell type classes.
In the do block, there are two commands. The first command ‘‘x <- stat -< ();’’ binds the value of the secret
computation stat to a local variable x, where x has type Int. Now, x can be freely used in any computation, but it
cannot escape the scope of the do-block. The next command ‘‘if..then..else..’’ performs a conditional branching in
the sublanguage. The body of the branch ‘‘returnA -< i’’ generates the output for the do-block. Finally, the computation
represented by the ‘‘proc ...do’’ block is bound to the variable stat’ and it is returned as the result.
The function admin_service implements a similar session for administrator services. It has the same type signature as
guest_service.
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admin_service: Priv->(Protected Int)->IO(Protected Int)
admin_service priv stat = do
{ let low = stat >>> (declassify HIGH LOW) in
let summary = cert priv low () in
putStrLn (show summary);
let stat_new = (pure (\_->0) >>> tag HIGH) in
return stat_new;
} 
In contrast to the previous function, admin_service uses the combinators provided by the sublanguage directly, without
using the do-syntax. In the first let expression, it declassifies the protected state to LOW level using the declassify
operation and binds the result to the variable low. The variable low also has type Protected Int, but the security level
associated with it is LOW after the declassification. Then, it uses the cert operation, together with its code privilege priv,
to access the computation protected in low. The result summary has an unrestricted Int type and thus can be used as any
other common Haskell value. The next line calls the standard Haskell printing function putStrLn to send this value to the
program output. Finally, it creates a new protected value stat_new initialized to 0, sets the security policy of this protected
value to be HIGH, and returns it as the new global state.
The service_loop function is part of the trusted computing base. It authenticates users anddispatches to the appropriate
service. 
service_loop::(Protected AuthDB)->(Protected Int)->IO()
service_loop auth_db stat = do
{
putStrLn "Enter username and password:";
u <- getLine; p <- getLine;
let (ident,priv) = authenticate auth_db u p
;
stat_new <- case ident of
"admin" -> admin_service priv stat;
"guest" -> guest_service priv stat;
_ -> do {
putStrLn "login error";
return stat;
};
service_loop auth_db stat_new;
} 
On every loop, it reads a user name and a password from the input, and authenticates the user. The variable auth_db contains
the authentication database, which is a list of user names, passwords and code privileges. The authenticate function
searches for the current user in the authentication database and retrieves the corresponding code privilege. Once a code
privilege is available, it is used to execute the corresponding service function.
The top-level main function is also part of the trusted computing base. It creates the authentication database and the
initial global state, both are tagged by the security label HIGH. 
main = do
{
let auth_db :: (Protected AuthDB) =
(
pure (\_-> [("admin","admin",HIGH),
("guest","guest",LOW)] ) >>>
tag HIGH
)
secret_val :: (Protected Int) =
(
pure (\_->0) >>>
tag HIGH
)
in
service_loop auth_db secret_val;
} 
Security guarantees:
To see how this code enforces our information-flow policies, suppose an untrusted programmer adds the following code in
guest_service to declassify the secret state:
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term e ::= () | x | λx.e | e e | fix e
| ci e | case e e e | (e,e) | pii e (i ∈ {1, 2})
| pure e l | e >>> e | e &&& e | e ||| e | loop e
| tag l | decl l→l | cert e
| FA(e, l→l,Φ) | •
value v ::= () | x | λx.e | ci e | (e,e) | FA(e, l→l,Φ)
Fig. 4. Formalizing the sublanguage. 
let s = cert priv (stat >>> declassify HIGH LOW) () 
Or, suppose the services are incorrectly dispatched: 
stat_new <- case ident of
"admin" -> guest_service priv stat −− should be admin_service
"guest" -> admin_service priv stat −− should be guest_service 
In such cases, when the program tries to declassify the data and certify the result using the guest privilege, a run-time
error will be generated. The global state is tagged with the label HIGH, but guests can only acquire LOW privileges during the
authentication process. The declassification operation requires that the user privilegemust be higher than the security level
of the data to be declassified. Therefore, a guest cannot declassify the global state to LOW and use cert to steal the secret
state. This provides a security mechanism similar to that of using run-time principals [16].
Aside from the authentication process and initial setup of confidential state, the information-flow policies are
automatically enforced throughout the system. The guest_service and the admin_service are very simple in this example,
but they can be scaled to more complex services, system states and security policies.
The application program is a fine-grained mixture of normal components written in standard Haskell and secure
components constructed using a few special operations from the sublanguage. At a glance, it may be hard to distinguish
where the ‘‘embedded’’ language ends and the ‘‘base’’ language begins, but that is part of the point—the programmer has
easy access to both the strong security guarantees of the embedded language and the full power of Haskell at the same time:
all the Haskell language features and software libraries are still available.
5. Formalizing the security guarantee
This section studies the formal security guarantees of the embedded FlowArrow sublanguage. Because our sublanguage
is used in a purely functional setting, the type system shown in Fig. 1 is fairly simple. Instead of reasoning about all the
information-flow channels in a program, it only checks the information flow of an individual channel, which is represented
by a purely functional computation.
The traditional notion of noninterference is also simplified in this setting. Noninterference requires that the low outputs
of a program do not depend on high inputs. In the purely functional programming style, this is simply saying that high
computations cannot be certified for use at low output channels. The addition of declassification makes the security
guaranteemore interesting. Informally, the security guarantee can be stated as: ‘‘code running at privilege lp cannot observe
information of label l if ¬(l v lp)’’.
Another question concerns the soundness of the run-time checking mechanism, i.e. the implementation of cert. We
need to formally prove that the checking mechanism itself is not a source of information leakage.
5.1. Language syntax and semantics
We formalize the security sublanguage as a simple call-by-need λ-calculus extended with sums, products and the
primitive arrow operationswe defined in FlowArrow, as shown in Fig. 4. Two special syntax nodes are added to the language.
FA(e, l1 → l2,Φ) represents the run-time representation of the FlowArrow data type and it does not appear in source
programs. The special syntax node • is used to represent term erasure, which is explained below. The operational semantics
of this language is formalized in Fig. 5 using evaluation contexts. Note that the evaluation relation (−→p) is parameterized
by the code privilege p. In the operational semantics, the predicate valid(lp,Φ) means that all the label constraints in Φ
are valid under code privilege p: it checks that the expected ordering of security labels are all correct and that the user has
enough privilege to run the code.
valid(lp,Φ)
4= (∀leq(l1, l2) ∈ Φ. l1 v l2) ∧ (∀usergeq(l) ∈ Φ. l v lp).
For ease of presentation, this formal language is made simpler than the actual FlowArrow implementation. The major
differences are:
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E ::= [] | E e | case E e e | pii E | cert E | E op e | v op E | loop E
(op ∈ {>>>, |||, &&&})
E[(λx.e1) e2] −→p E[[e2/x]e1]
E[fix e] −→p E[e (fix e)]
E[case (ci e) e1 e2] −→p E[ei e]
E[pii (e1,e2)] −→p E[ei]
E[pure e l] −→p E[FA(e, l→l,∅)]
E[tag l] −→p E[FA(λx.x, l→l,∅)]
E[decl l1→l2] −→p E[FA(λx.x, l1→l2, {usergeq(l1)})]
E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})]
E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (e1 x)) (λy.c2 (e2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)]
E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) &&& FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.(e1 (pi1 x),e2 (pi2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)]
E[loop FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)]
−→p E[FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (e a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})]
l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ)
E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)] −→p E[c1 e]
¬(l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ))
E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)] −→p E[c2 ()]
Fig. 5. Operational semantics.
erasep(•) = •
erasep(()) = ()
erasep(x) = x
erasep(λx.e) = λx.erasep(e)
erasep(e1 e2) = erasep(e1) erasep(e2)
erasep(fix e) = fix (erasep(e))
erasep(ci e) = ci erasep(e)
erasep(case e1 e2 e3) = case erasep(e1) erasep(e2) erasep(e3)
erasep((e1,e2)) = (erasep(e1),erasep(e2))
erasep(e1 op e2) = erasep(e1) op erasep(e2)
erasep((loop e)) = loop (erasep(e))
erasep(tag l) = tag l
erasep(decl l1→l2) = decl l1→l2
erasep(pure e l) =
{
pure (erasep(e)) l : l v lp
FA(•, l→l,∅) : otherwise
erasep(FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)) =
{
FA(erasep(e), l1→l2,Φ) : l2 v lp ∧ valid(lp,Φ)
FA(•, l1→l2,Φ) : otherwise
erasep([]) = []
erasep(E e) = erasep(E) erasep(e)
erasep(case E e1 e2) = case erasep(E) erasep(e1) erasep(e2)
erasep(pii E) = pii erasep(E)
erasep(cert E) = cert erasep(E)
erasep(E op e) = erasep(E) op erasep(e)
erasep(v op E) = erasep(v) op erasep(E)
erasep((loop E)) = loop (erasep(E))
Fig. 6. Term erasure and the modified semantics.
• Label inference. In the actual FlowArrow implementation, the pure operation creates a flow type l→lwhere the label l is
polymorphic and it can always be inferred from the context when FlowArrow values are combined. Our formal language
in Fig. 4 requires the label l be explicitly annotated in the pure operation. This explicit annotation makes programming
less convenient, but it makes the semantics less verbose and it does not affect the expressiveness and the security
guarantee of the language.
• Label computations. In the actual implementation, labels are first-class terms and the program can manipulate labels
in arbitrary ways. Our formal language does not permit interesting computations on labels, but the programmer still
has the ability to manipulate labels in interesting ways. For example, instead of writing tag (case e λx.l1 λx.l2), the
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goodp(()) = T
goodp(x) = T
goodp(λx.e) = goodp(e)
goodp(e1 e2) = goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2)
goodp(fix e) = goodp(e)
goodp(ci e) = goodp(e)
goodp(case e1 e2 e3) = goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2) ∧ goodp(e3)
goodp((e1,e2)) = goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2)
goodp(e1 op e2) = goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2)
goodp(loop e) = goodp(e)
goodp(tag l) = T
goodp(decl l1→l2) = T
goodp(cert e) = goodp(e)
goodp(pure e l) = goodp(e)
goodp(FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)) = goodp(e) ∧ [(¬(l1 v lp) ∧ (l2 v lp))⇒ ¬valid(lp,Φ)]
Fig. 7. Invariant under evaluation.
programmer can write case e (λx.tag l1) (λx.tag l2). For any finite security lattice, this simplification indeed does not
make a difference in terms of expressiveness.
5.2. Erasure and the modified semantics
To help formalize the security guarantee of this language, we use the technique of term erasing: a ‘‘useless’’ part of a
term is rewritten to a special syntax node ‘‘•’’. Fig. 6 shows the definition of erasure for terms and evaluation contexts.
The idea is that any protected computation with output labels higher than the current code privilege can be safely erased,
because information from such a computation cannot be observed during code execution. Also, any protected computation
with unsatisfiable label constraints can also be erased because the cert operation will eventually eliminate them. These
ideas are made precise in Fig. 6, where the interesting cases are for pure and FA—the remaining cases simply extend the
erasep(−) function homomorphically over terms. It is worth noting that the pure rule is redundant: it could be given as
erasep(pure e l) = pure (erasep(e)) l. We state the rule in the form in Fig. 6 to simplify the proof of Theorem 5.3.1.
We also need to define an alternate evaluation relation (H⇒p) for erased terms. The erased terms evaluate in the same
way as normal terms, except that after every step of evaluation, the result is erased again, as shown in the following
definition:
e1 −→p e2
e1 H⇒p erasep(e2)
The semantics of (H⇒p) guarantees that ‘‘useless’’ FA nodes are erased as soon as they are created.
5.3. The security guarantee
Our strategy is to formalize the security guarantee by establishing a simulation between normal term evaluation (−→p)
and erased term evaluation (H⇒p). The intuition is that a program runs as if its high security components are erased. Such
components are never used, so high security information is not leaked. Lemma5.3.1 establishes this simulation, Lemma5.3.2
generalizes the simulation to multiple steps and Theorem 5.3.1 use the simulation to prove a noninterference-like result.
The crucial part of this strategy is to connect the meaning of the information-flow type systemwe implemented in Fig. 1
with the operational semantics: how can we know that the type system guarantees that all high security computations are
erased during evaluation? To do so, we need to formally define what terms are ‘‘well-formed’’ and prove that the evaluation
relation (−→p) preserves this predicate as an invariant.
Fig. 7 defines an invariant predicate goodp() that is preserved by the evaluation relation (−→p), as shown in Lemma5.3.1.
It states that for all the records FA(e, l1→ l2,Φ) created at run time, if the flow l1→ l2 is not permitted using the current
code privilege, then the constraint Φ must be unsatisfiable. Intuitively, this invariant specifies the semantics of the simple
information-flow type systemwe implemented. If l v lp then l is considered as a low security label; otherwise it is considered
as a high security label. The invariant goodp() permits the following kinds of information flow: from low to low, from high
to high, from low to high, but it disallows the information flow from high to low (by generating unsatisfiable constraints).
Using this definition, Lemma 5.3.1 and Lemma 5.3.2 are restricted to only well-formed terms that satisfy the invariant
goodp(). As shown later in the proof of Lemma 5.3.1, this restriction is necessary to establish the simulation between (−→p)
and (H⇒p).
We begin with propositions about the validity of constraint sets.
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Proposition 5.3.1 (Properties of Label Constraints).
(1) valid(lp,Φ ∪ Φ ′)⇒ valid(lp,Φ)
(2) ¬(valid(lp,Φ))⇒ ¬(valid(lp,Φ ∪ Φ ′))
Proof. By definition of valid. 
We next establish some simple propositions about the compositional behavior of erasep(−).
Proposition 5.3.2 (Properties of Term Erasure).
(1) erasep(E[e]) = erasep(E)[erasep(e)]
(2) erasep([e2/x]e1) = [erasep(e2)/x]erasep(e1)
(3) erasep(erasep(e)) = erasep(e)
(4) erasep(erasep(E)) = erasep(E)
(5)
erasep(E)[e1] −→p erasep(E)[e2]
erasep(E)[e1] H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(e2)]
Proof. By induction on terms and evaluation contexts. 
The following standard propositions express that the operational semantics of our simple language is deterministic and
that the erased version of the evaluation relation is also deterministic.
Proposition 5.3.3 (Deterministic Evaluation).
(1) For any term e, there is a unique E and a unique e′ such that e = E[e′].
(2) The evaluation relation (−→p) is deterministic.
(3) The evaluation relation (H⇒p) is deterministic.
Proof. By induction on terms and evaluation contexts. 
Finally, we need some inversion principles related to the goodp(−) predicate.
Proposition 5.3.4 (Properties of the Invariant).
(1) Inversion holds for each rule in the definition of goodp():
(a) goodp(λx.e)⇒ goodp(e)
(b) goodp(e1 e2)⇒ goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2)
(c) . . .
(2) goodp(E[e])⇒ goodp(e).
(3) goodp(E[e1]) ∧ goodp(e2)⇒ goodp(E[e2]).
(4) goodp(e1) ∧ goodp(e2) ⇐⇒ goodp([e2/x]e1).
Proof. By definition of goodp(−) and induction on terms and evaluation contexts. 
Putting together the propositions above, we can establish the following simulation relation between the language and its
erased version. The lemma simultaneously proves that goodp(−) actually is an invariant.
Lemma 5.3.1 (Single-Step Simulation). If goodp(e1) and e1 −→p e2, then goodp(e2) and erasep(e1) H⇒∗p erasep(e2).
Proof Sketch. Case analysis on the evaluation rule used in e1 −→p e2.
(1) E[(λx.e1) e2] −→p E[[e2/x]e1].
Given goodp(E[(λx.e1) e2]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that goodp(e1), goodp(e2), goodp([e2/x]e1]) and
goodp(E[[e2/x]e1]).
Now we need to prove that erasep(E[(λx.e1) e2]) H⇒∗p erasep(E[[e2/x]e1]):
erasep(E[(λx.e1) e2])
= erasep(E)[(λx.erasep(e1)) erasep(e2)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep([erasep(e2)/x]erasep(e1))]
= erasep(E)[[erasep(e2)/x]erasep(e1)]
= erasep(E[[e2/x]e1]) (by Proposition 5.3.2)
Each step in the above derivation can be justified by Proposition 5.3.2.
(2) E[fix e] −→p E[e (fix e)]. Similar.
(3) E[case (ci e) e1 e2] −→p E[ei e]. Similar.
(4) E[pii (e1,e2)] −→p E[ei]. Similar.
(5) E[pure e l] −→p E[FA(e, l→l,∅)]
Given goodp(E[pure e l]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that goodp(e). By definition we know that
goodp(FA(e, l→l,∅)) always holds because l and l are the same label. Therefore we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove
that goodp(E[FA(e, l→l,∅)]).
Now we need to prove erasep(E[pure e l]) H⇒∗p erasep(E[FA(e, l→l,∅)]).
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(a) If l v lp:
erasep(E[pure e l])
= erasep(E)[pure erasep(e) l]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(erasep(e), l→l,∅))]
= erasep(E)[FA(erasep(e), l→l,∅)]
= erasep(E[FA(e, l→l,∅)])
(b) If ¬(l v lp):
erasep(E[pure e l])
= erasep(E)[FA(•, l→l,∅)]
H⇒∗p erasep(E)[FA(•, l→l,∅)] (0 steps)= erasep(E[FA(e, l→l,∅)])
(6) E[tag l] −→p E[FA(λx.x, l→l,∅)]. Similar to E[pure e l].
(7) E[decl l1→ l2] −→p E[FA(λx.x, l1→ l2, {usergeq(l1)})]. Similar to previous cases except we need to verify that this
rule indeed preserves goodp().
(8) E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})].
This is the most interesting rule. Let us start from proving the invariant. Given goodp(E[FA(e1, l1 →
l3,Φ1) >>> FA(e2, l2 → l4,Φ2)]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that goodp(FA(e1, l1 → l3,Φ1)),
goodp(FA(e2, l2→ l4,Φ2)), goodp(e1),goodp(e2) and goodp(λx.e2 (e1 x)). Then we use a case analysis to prove that
the invariant holds:
(a) If ¬(¬(l1 v lp) ∧ (l4 v lp)): by definition, we have
goodp(FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})),
so we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that
goodp(E[FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})]).
(b) If¬(l1 v lp) ∧ (l4 v lp): we use a case analysis to prove that¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}), thus the invariant
is preserved.
(i) If l2 v lp:
(A) If l3 v l2: by transitivity, l3 v lp. Now we have goodp(FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1)), ¬(l1 v lp) and (l3 v lp), we can
derive ¬valid(lp,Φ1). By Proposition 5.3.1, ¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}).
(B) If ¬(l3 v l2): by definition, ¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}).
(ii) If ¬(l2 v lp): we have goodp(FA(e2, l2→ l4,Φ2)), ¬(l2 v lp) and (l4 v lp), we can derive ¬valid(lp,Φ2). By
Proposition 5.3.1, ¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}).
Now we proceed to prove theH⇒p part of the lemma.
(a) If ¬(l4 v lp ∧ valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})): this is the easy case because the erasure of the result must be in
the erased form FA(•, . . . , . . .).
erasep(E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)])
= erasep(E)[FA(. . . , l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(. . . , l2→l4,Φ2)]]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(. . . , l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}))]
= erasep(E)[FA(•, l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})])
(b) If l4 v lp ∧ valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}): by Proposition 5.3.1, valid(lp,Φ1), valid(lp,Φ2) and l3 v l2.
(i) If l2 v lp: by transitivity, l3 v lp. The two sub-terms on the left-hand side are not erased:
erasep(E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)])
= erasep(E)[erasep(FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1)) >>> erasep(FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2))]
= erasep(E)[FA(erasep(e1), l1→l3,Φ1) >>> FA(erasep(e2), l2→l4,Φ2)]]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(λx.erasep(e2) (erasep(e1) x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)}))]
= erasep(E)[FA(λx.erasep(e2) (erasep(e1) x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.e2 (e1 x), l1→l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ {leq(l3, l2)})])
(ii) If ¬(l2 v lp): we have ¬(l2 v lp), (l4 v lp) and valid(lp,Φ2), which contradicts with our assumption that
goodp(FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)). So this case cannot happen.
(9) E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (e1 x)) (λy.c2 (e2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)].
Suppose goodp(E[FA(e1, l1 → l3,Φ1) ||| FA(e2, l2 → l4,Φ2)]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove
goodp(FA(e1, l1→ l3,Φ1)), goodp(FA(e2, l2→ l4,Φ2)), goodp(e1) and goodp(e2). Now we only need to prove that
goodp(FA(. . . , l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)).
(a) If l1 v lp and l2 v lp: then l1 u l2 v lp, so by definition, goodp(FA(. . . , l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)).
(b) If ¬(l1 v lp):
(i) If l3 v lp: by goodp(FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1))we know that ¬valid(lp,Φ1). By Proposition 5.3.1, ¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2).
Therefore, goodp(FA(. . . , l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)).
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(ii) If ¬(l3 v lp): because l3 v l3 unionsq l4, it must be the case that ¬(l3 unionsq l4 v lp). Therefore goodp(FA(. . . , l1 u l2→
l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)).
(c) If ¬(l2 v lp): the dual case.
Now we proceed to prove theH⇒p part of the lemma.
(a) If l3 v lp ∧ l4 v lp ∧ valid(lp,Φ1) ∧ valid(lp,Φ2): then l3 unionsq l4 v lp and valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2).
erasep(E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)])
= erasep(E)[erasep(FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1)) ||| erasep(FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2))]
= erasep(E)[FA(erasep(e1), l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(erasep(e2), l2→l4,Φ2)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (erasep(e1) x))
(λy.c2 (erasep(e2) x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2))]
= erasep(E)[FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (erasep(e1) x)) (λy.c2 (erasep(e2) x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (e1 x)) (λy.c2 (e2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)])
(b) If ¬(l3 v lp) ∨ ¬valid(lp,Φ1): then ¬(l3 unionsq l4 v lp) ∨ ¬valid(lp,Φ1 ∪ Φ2).
erasep(E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)])
= erasep(E)[erasep(FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1)) ||| erasep(FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2))]
= erasep(E)[FA(•, l1→l3,Φ1) ||| FA(. . . , l2→l4,Φ2)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (• x)) (λy.c2 (. . . x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2))]
= erasep(E)[FA(•, l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.case x (λy.c1 (e1 x)) (λy.c2 (e2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)])
(c) If ¬(l4 v lp) ∨ ¬valid(lp,Φ2): the dual case.
(10) E[FA(e1, l1→l3,Φ1) &&& FA(e2, l2→l4,Φ2)]
−→p E[FA(λx.(e1 (pi1 x),e2 (pi2 x)), l1 u l2→l3 unionsq l4,Φ1 ∪ Φ2)].
Similar to the previous case.
(11) E[loop FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)] −→p E[FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (e a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})]
It is easy to verify that the invariant holds. For the (−→p) relation there are two cases:
(a) If ¬(l2 v l1) ∨ erasep(FA(e, l1→ l2,Φ)) = FA(•, l1→ l2,Φ): then erasep(FA(. . . , l1→ l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})) =
FA(•, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)}).
So we can prove:
erasep(E[loop FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)])
= erasep(E)[loop FA(•, l1→l2,Φ)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(. . . , l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)}))]
= erasep(E)[FA(•, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (e a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})])
(b) If l2 v l1 ∧ erasep(FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)) = FA(erasep(e), l1→l2,Φ):
erasep(E[loop FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)])
= erasep(E)[loop FA(erasep(e), l1→l2,Φ)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (erasep(e) a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)}))]
= erasep(E)[FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (erasep(e) a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})]
= erasep(E[FA(λx.(pi1 (fix λp.λa.f (a,pi2 (e a)))) x, l1→l2,Φ ∪ {leq(l2, l1)})])
(12)
l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ)
E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)] −→p E[c1 e] .
Suppose goodp(E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that goodp(e) and goodp(E[c1 e]).
Given the condition l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ), we can prove:
erasep(E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)])
= erasep(E)[cert FA(erasep(e), l1→l2,Φ)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(c1 erasep(e))]
= erasep(E)[c1 erasep(e)]
= erasep(E[c1 e])
(13)
¬(l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ))
E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)] −→p E[c2 ()]
Suppose goodp(E[cert FA(e, l1→ l2,Φ)]), we can use Proposition 5.3.4 to prove that goodp(E[c2 ()]). Given the
condition ¬(l2 v⊥ ∧ valid(lp,Φ)), we can prove:
erasep(E[cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ)])
= erasep(E)[erasep(cert FA(e, l1→l2,Φ))]
= erasep(E)[cert FA(. . . , l1→l2,Φ)]
H⇒p erasep(E)[erasep(c2 ())]
= erasep(E[c2 ()]) 
Lemma 5.3.2 (Multiple-Step Simulation). If goodp(e1) and e1 −→∗p e2, then goodp(e2) and erasep(e1) H⇒∗p erasep(e2).
Proof. Straightforward induction using Lemma 5.3.1. 
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Now we have established a simulation between term evaluation (−→p) and erased term evaluation (H⇒p), we can
proceed to formalize the security guarantee. Intuitively, secret information cannot be leaked because the program runs
as if such information is erased. Theorem 5.3.1 gives a noninterference-like security guarantee:
Theorem 5.3.1 (Security Guarantee). If ¬(l v lp), e has no FA or • syntax nodes and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then
∀e1.∀e2. (e (pure e1 l) −→∗p ci ()) ∧ (e (pure e2 l) −→∗p cj ())⇒ i = j.
This theorem states that, if an input of the program e has a security label l higher than the current code privilege, then there
is no information flow from that input to the output of the program execution using the current code privilege. Note that
the operation cert can be used freely in the program, this theorem also guarantees that the result of cert does not leak
information about the secret values.
Proof. Because e has no FA or • syntax nodes, it is easy to verify that goodp(e (pure e1 l)) and goodp(e (pure e2 l)). Using
Lemma 5.3.2, we know that erasep(e (pure e1 l)) H⇒∗p erasep(ci ()) and erasep(e (pure e2 l)) H⇒∗p erasep(cj ()).
However, erasep(e (pure e1 l)) = erasep(e) FA(•, l→ l,∅) and erasep(e (pure e2 l)) = erasep(e)FA(•, l→l,∅) , so we
have erasep(e)FA(•, l→l,∅)
H⇒∗p ci () and erasep(e)FA(•, l→l,∅) H⇒∗p cj (). By Proposition 5.3.3, the evaluation relationH⇒p is deterministic, the
term erasep(e) FA(•, l→l,∅) can only be normalized to one value, so i = j. 
6. Discussion and future work
6.1. Compile time versus run time
For applications written using the embedded language, there are two stages of type checking. At compile time, the
base language (in this case, Haskell) is type checked and compiled. At run time, the embedded language is type checked
before embedded secure computations are executed. Therefore, the information-flowpolicy violations are not detected until
the application is launched. Although the sublanguage uses static analysis techniques and provides similar strong security
guarantees, this two-stage mechanism is sometimes not as convenient as specialized languages such as Jif. Each run of the
application may only use part of the secure computations, so debugging can be more difficult. Therefore, it is appealing to
have a one-stage, compile-time enforcementmechanism for the sublanguage. Such amechanism can be possible if it is built
entirely in the static type system of the host language.
Abadi et al. developed the dependency core calculus (DCC) [1], which uses a hierarchy of monads to model information
flow. Tse and Zdancewic [17] translated DCC to System F and showed that noninterference can be translated to a more
generic property called parametricity, which states that polymorphic programs behave uniformly for all their instantiations.
An intuitive demonstration of this idea is that abstract data types can be used as a protection mechanism to hide high
security information. They presented a Haskell implementation where each security level is encoded using an abstract data
type and binding operators are defined to compose computations with permitted information flows. This approach works
well for simple lattices, but encoding the security lattice of n points would require O(n2) definitions for binding operators.
This makes it difficult to implement more complex security lattices such as the decentralized label model.
The problemwith this approach is policy expressiveness. The type system of the base languagemust be expressive enough
to encode the syntax and the semantics of security policies. Although Haskell has an expressive type system, it is not clear
how to encode more expressive policies directly in the type language — we leave that as a open question to investigate in
the future.
6.2. Parallel composition and arrow axioms
We used the arrow interface to build the embedded language, but it remains to show that FlowArrow satisfies the
appropriate arrow axioms. A quick check of the arrow axioms [10] shows that the exchange axiom does not seem to hold.
Let f have the flow type l1 → l2 and g have the flow type l3 → l4. There are two canonical ways to compose f and g in
parallel using the first combinator. They should be equivalent:
first f >>> pure (id × g) = pure (id × g) >>> first f
However, our FlowArrow implementation yields the flow type l1 → l4 with constraints {l2 v l3} on the left side and l3 → l2
with {l4 v l1} on the right. This seems to violate the arrow axioms! Does our implementation make sense?
If we compose f and g naturally using the (***) operator, we get l1 u l3 → l2 unionsq l4 with no constraints, which is the least
restrictive flow type. The types we get from using first are both more restrictive than this one. The problem with using
first is that our analysis technique is not fine-grained enough—it reasons about information flow in a syntax-directed, end-
to-end fashion that yields imprecise flow types for first f >>> pure (id × g). This coarse analysis does not compromise
the security guarantee because it always is conservative.
To justify that our arrow implementation satisfies the arrowaxioms,wewould need to give finer semantic interpretations
to the flow types and constraints. Intuitively, although both sides of the exchange axiom are over-restrictive and have
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different types, they can be considered equivalent in the sense that they are both sound: using such flow types will not
lead to acceptance of insecure programs.
The practical ramification of this imprecision is that although soundness is not affected by using first, programmers
are encouraged to use the (&&&), (***), (|||), (+++) operations directly so that safe programs are more likely to be
accepted. The use of first, second, left, right should be avoided whenever possible. Compared to first, (&&&) is a
more intuitive operation for parallel composition because it resembles the product morphism in category theory. The prior
work on arrows [3] uses first as the primitive operation because it is simpler and it gives a definite evaluation order.
Another consequence of this imprecision is that the security analysis can be too restrictive for arrow computations
written in the do-syntax, because Haskell implements some translation rules using first instead of (&&&). Fortunately,
conditional branches are translated using (|||), so programmers can still write conditional branches in the natural way. In
general, we need a more precise type system to avoid depending on particular implementations of the translation rules of
the do-syntax.
6.3. DLM and practical applications
The declassification mechanism in this paper can be adapted to work with the decentralized label model (DLM) [7], where
the constraints on code authority are expressed using the act-for relation of principals. We are currently working on the
encoding and integration of DLM in the arrows framework. Unlike Jif, where information-flow control are mostly static,
the arrows framework is a run-time mechanism, so the principals, the act-for hierarchy and the security lattice can all be
dynamic. Such dynamic policies have long been sought in language-based information-flow security because they address
practical requirements.
Once the dynamicDLM is implemented, itwill be interesting to see how itworks in real applications. An important benefit
of our approach is that existing Haskell applications can be enhanced with information-flow control without complete
rewriting. The programmers may proceed gradually by changing the representation of secure components while leaving
most normal components untouched. It would be ideal if the security-sensitive computation only takes a small portion of
the whole program, so information-flow policies can be globally enforced by a few local modifications to the program.
As mentioned in Section 3.7, there are still interesting open questions about the protection and revocation of code
privileges. Moreover, the dynamic checking in our approach makes debugging more difficult because run-time errors are
hard to observe, reproduce and locate. All of these problems need to be explored in the context ofmore concrete applications.
6.4. Implementing other type systems
Although FlowArrow is a generic arrow transformer, the type system implemented in FlowArrow onlyworkswith arrows
that have no side-effects, because we assign a simple information-flow type l1 → l2 to such arrow computations. This
raises two questions. First, what arrows can be used besides the function arrow (->)? The stream processor arrow [3] is
one example: we can use FlowArrow to track information flow for stream processors, which map input streams to output
streams. But in general, we need to formally state the properties of arrows that can be used with FlowArrow. Another
question is how to modify the type system in FlowArrow so that it works for mutable state and other side-effects. We
conjecture that for a specific effect such as mutable state, we can extend the type system implemented in FlowArrow and
lift the arrow operations such as get and put to FlowArrowwhile implementing appropriate typing rules. The feasibility of
this approach has yet to be studied, but one intriguing possibility is the potential to use multiple security type systems in
one application at the same time.
7. Conclusion
Using an embedded sublanguage of arrows, end-to-end information-flow policies can be directly encoded and enforced
in Haskell using modular library extensions, with a modest overhead of run-time checking. There is no need to modify the
Haskell language, and this embedded sublanguage approach permits information-flow technology to be adopted gradually.
The security mechanism is designed to be generic with respect to computation types and security lattices. There is great
flexibility in the choice of security-policy frameworks and multiple policy frameworks can co-exist in the same program.
Dynamic information-flow policies can be expressed, yet the security guarantee is as strong as that of static analysis. This
paper has demonstrated one example of this embedded security-typed language approach, and established its proof of
noninterference.
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